Useful Government Spending and the International Transmission of Fiscal Policy by Tervala, Juha
Useful Government Spending and the
International Transmission of Fiscal Policy
Juha Tervala¤
University of Helsinki and HECER
University of Helsinki, Department of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 623:2006
ISBN 952-10-2766-5, ISSN 1459-3696
January 13, 2006
Abstract
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1 Introduction
How are …scal expansions transmitted in open economies? Does a domes-
tic …scal expansion cause an increase or a decline in foreign production?
How do the international e¤ects of a …scal expansion depend on the com-
position of public expenditures? Even though such questions are central to
open economy macroeconomics, there is no common agreement on the an-
swers. The aim of this paper is to examine the international e¤ects of …scal
policy shocks and the channels through which the shocks are transmitted
across countries. To address these issues, we develop a new open economy
macroeconomic model based on the local-currency pricing (LCP) paradigm
in which the prices of imported goods are temporarily rigid in the importing
country’s currency. The model is based on the models of Betts and Dev-
ereux (2000) and Senay (1998). We use a staggered price setting framework,
which implies that it is not possible to obtain a closed-form solution to the
model, and thus its calibrated and log-linearized version is simulated nu-
merically. One advantage of the use of a staggered price setting framework
is that it allows for richer dynamic e¤ects of …scal policy than those found
in the models with simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing that are common in
the literature.
Since the publication of the seminal Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model (1995) the
…eld of open economy macroeconomics has witnessed the development of
new models for the analysis of international policy transmission. Although
the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)1 has paid a lot of attention
to the international transmission of economic shocks, those studies mostly
focus on the transmission of monetary policy shocks. For example, as Kim
and Roubini (2004, 11) highlight “there is lack of detailed studies on the
e¤ects of …scal policy". In particular, they underline that "[t]he e¤ects of
…scal policy on the current account and the real exchange rate in calibrated
versions of these NOEM models are still waiting to be analyzed."
In most NOEM models, government spending is pure waste and it does
not a¤ect private utility or productivity. However, any role for …scal policy
requires that government spending is someway useful. One way to motivate
government spending is to introduce government consumption that yields
utility. In this paper, we allow for utility-enhancing government spending,
by modelling private and government consumption as substitutes in private
utility, as in Ganelli (2003).2 Another way to motivate government spending
is to assume government services that a¤ect production. In this paper, we
1An excellent survey of the NOEM literature by Lane (2001) focuses completely on
monetary policy issues. Lane and Ganelli (2003) survey more recent developments in the
literature and also …scal policy issues. Coutinho (2003) focuses completely on …scal policy
issues.
2The original idea of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes in
private utility dates back to Bailey (1971, Ch 9).
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allow for government spending that is a productive input for private produc-
ers, as in Barro (1990). This idea is commonly used in the economic growth
literature. In open economy macroeconomics, however, the consequences of
productive government spending on the international transmission of …scal
policy has been ignored.
A key issue that has been at the core of current research on open-economy
modelling is the currency denomination of sticky prices (see e.g. Lane and
Ganelli 2003). Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) assume that prices are sticky in
the currency of the producer. A central idea of producer currency pricing
(PCP) is the traditional expenditure-switching role for the nominal exchange
rate. Under PCP, the degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices
is 1 and a country with a depreciating currency experiences a fall in the
relative price of its exports which in turn causes a redirection of world ex-
penditure in favour of its products. When preferences are identical across
countries, all goods are freely tradable and exchange-rate pass-through to
import prices is complete, the law of one price always holds for all goods
and the real exchange rate is constant.
Motivated by the weak empirical support for the law of one price in
internationally traded goods and the evidence of limited exchange-rate pass-
through to import prices, Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001), Senay (1998)
and others have preferred an alternative assumption. This class of models
assumes the possibility of segmentation across countries allowing …rms to
charge di¤erent prices for the same good in home and foreign markets. This
pricing-to-market (PTM) approach goes much further than simply assuming
that …rms can price discriminate across countries. As emphasized e.g. by
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), in addition to PTM, this class of models also
assumes that prices are sticky in each country in terms of local currency.
PTM in combination with local-currency pricing (PTM-LCP) implies that
exchange rate changes cause proportional short-run deviations from the law
of one price.3 When import prices are sticky in each country’s local currency,
the short-run degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is zero.
As is well known, the PTM-LCP approach implies "a radical rethinking of
the traditional expenditure-switching role of exchange rates" (Obstfeld –
Rogo¤ 2000, 122).4
As indicated above, the model we develop in this paper uses the PTM-
LCP approach. This approach certainly has weaknesses as emphasized by
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). Obstfeld (2002) goes one step further arguing
that the assumption about PTM-LCP stems from oversimpli…ed modelling
strategy rather than from evidence. Whatever the truth, we adopt below a
model in which prices are sticky in each country in terms of local currency.
3Engel and Rogers (2001) show that LCP explains a large part of deviations from the
law of one price.
4Also Engel (2002) and Obstfeld (2002) discuss how LCP a¤ects the expenditure switch-
ing e¤ect of nominal exchange rate changes.
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This assumption may not match reality exactly, but we believe that it is
worth analyzing the international transmission of …scal policy shocks in a
model which is built on the PTM-LCP approach.
We show that the introduction of productive government spending in-
creases the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. The assumption of non-productive
government spending, hence, leads to an underestimation of the e¤ectiveness
of …scal policy. The main point of this paper could be that the composition
of public expenditures matters. If public expenditures are used to …nance
public services that are inputs for private producers, the international ef-
fects of …scal policy can be quite di¤erent than in the case where public
expenditures are used to public consumption that is a close substitute for
private consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the
model and derive the equilibrium conditions. In Section 3 we use the model
to analyze the international transmission of …scal policy. As hinted above,
we emphasize the consequences of useful government spending. While most
studies focus on the e¤ects of permanent …scal shocks, we also show how
temporary …scal shocks are transmitted. In this section, we also show that
the quantitative e¤ects of a …scal shock on the real exchange rate and the
international distribution of wealth are sensitive to the choice of some key
parameter values. Finally, in Section 4 we provide some conclusions.
2 The Model
This section presents the framework used in the analysis, which is based on
the models of Betts and Devereux (2000) and Senay (1998). Both papers
develop a version of the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model (1995), in which the two
markets are segmented, allowing a fraction of …rms to price discriminate
across countries, and in which prices are sticky in the buyer’s currency. In
addition, Senay (1998) uses a staggered price setting framework. In the
model developed here we assume that all …rms can set di¤erent prices in
di¤erent countries, all prices are sticky in the buyer’s currency and that
prices are set in a staggered fashion.
A di¤erence between this model and that of Senay (1998) is in the struc-
ture of the …nancial market. In this model there is only one internationally
traded bond, denominated in domestic currency [as in Betts and Devereux
(2000)], while in her model households divide their bond holdings between
domestic and foreign bonds. The main di¤erence between this paper and
that of Senay’s is the aim of the analysis. She focuses the analysis on how
increasing …nancial and goods market integration changes the e¤ectiveness
of …scal and monetary policy and she represents the e¤ects of …scal pol-
icy only on a few domestic macroeconomic variables. Thus she completely
ignores the analysis of the international transmission of …scal policy which
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forms the core of this paper.
An important precursor of this study is also the paper by Betts and
Devereux (2001) which develops a staggered price setting model that uses
the PTM-LCP approach. The main di¤erences to Betts and Devereux (2001)
are, …rst, that their model allows for capital accumulation while this model
abstracts capital formation. Second, they allow for a distinction between the
elasticity of substitution between goods within sectors and the elasticity of
substitution between sectors (the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods).
In all above mentioned papers, government spending is assumed to be
pure waste and does not a¤ect productivity or private utility. We instead
allow for useful government spending. First, government spending that may
enter the production function as a factor of production that is complemen-
tary to labour. Second, government consumption can be a substitute for
private consumption, as in Ganelli (2003). The main di¤erences to Ganelli
(2003) are that he assumes that prices are set one period in advance in terms
of producers’currencies and that he obtains analytical solutions.
2.1 Households
The world is made of two countries, Home and Foreign, and is populated by
a continuum of households. Each household produces a single di¤erentiated
good, indexed by z. We normalize the world size to 1 and consider that
…rst n households reside in the Home country. All households have identical
preferences. The utility function of a typical Home household is given by
Ut (z) =
1X
s=t
¯s¡t
"
log (Cs + ´Gs) +
Â
1 ¡ "
µ
Ms
Ps
¶1¡"
¡ `s (z)
2
2
#
: (1)
In this equation Ct and Gt are private and government consumption baskets
(to be de…ned below), ´ (0 · ´ · 1) is the marginal rate of substitution
between private and government consumption, Mt is nominal balances, Pt
is the consumer price index (to be de…ned below), " is the inverse of the
consumption elasticity of money demand and ` denotes the labour supply.
In equation (1) variable C is a real consumption index
C =
24 1Z
0
c(z)
µ¡1
µ dz
35
µ
µ¡1
;
where c(z) is consumption of good z and µ (> 1) is the elasticity of substi-
tution between di¤erentiated goods. The government’s composite consump-
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tion is analogous
G =
24 1Z
0
g(z)
µ¡1
µ dz
35
µ
µ¡1
:
The Home country CPI is
Pt =
24 nZ
0
pt (z)
1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n
pt (z
¤)dz
35 11¡µ ; (2)
where p (z) denotes the Home currency price of a Home-produced good z
and p (z¤) is the Home currency price of a Foreign good z.
A Foreign households’s utility function is completely identical to that of
a Home household. The Foreign country CPI is
P ¤t =
24 nZ
0
p¤t (z)
1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n
p¤t (z
¤) dz
35 11¡µ ; (3)
where p¤ (z) is the Foreign currency price of a Home good z and p¤ (z¤) is
the Foreign currency price of the Foreign-produced good.
The Home country’s import and export price indexes, respectively, are
de…ned as
bt (z
¤) =
·Z 1
n
pt (z
¤)1¡µ dz
¸ 1
1¡µ
;
b¤t (z) =
24 nZ
0
p¤t (z)
1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ :
For future reference, the Home terms of trade, the relative price of Home
imports in terms of Home exports, can be expresses as
TOTt =
bt (z
¤)
Etb¤t (z)
; (4)
where E is the nominal exchange rate (the Home currency price of Foreign
currency).
The budget constraint of a typical Home household is
Mt + ±tDt = Dt¡1 + Mt¡1 + wt`t ¡ PtCt + ¼t ¡ Pt¿ t; (5)
where Mt is the money holding at the beginning of the period and ±t is the
nominal price of a bond (± = (1 + R)¡1, where R is the nominal Home inter-
est rate). In addition, Dt denotes holdings of Home currency denominated
nominal bonds, w is the nominal wage rate , ¼ represents the nominal pro…ts
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of Home …rms (Home households own Home …rms and Foreign households
own Foreign …rms) and ¿ denotes per capita taxes.
There is an integrated world capital market and the only asset households
trade is a nominal bond, denominated in Home currency. The aggregate
asset-market-clearing conditions is thus given by nDt + (1 ¡ n)D¤t = 0.
Then the budget constraint of a representative Foreign household is
M¤t + ±
¤
t
D¤t
Et
=
D¤t¡1
Et
+ M¤t¡1 + w
¤
t `
¤
t ¡ P ¤t C¤t + ¼¤t ¡ P ¤t ¿¤t : (6)
2.2 First-Order Conditions for the Typical Household’s Prob-
lem
A typical Home household maximizes the utility function subject to the
budget constraint, speci…ed in equation (5). The …rst-order condition for
optimal consumption is
±tPt+1 (Ct+1 + ´Gt+1) = ¯Pt (Ct + ´Gt) : (7)
This Euler equation states that the household’s intertemporal consumption
pro…le is chosen to smooth "e¤ective consumption" (that is C + ´G). The
…rst-order condition governing the household’s optimal labour supply can
be written as
`t =
wt
(Ct + ´Gt)Pt
: (8)
Equation (8) ensures that the marginal disutility of labour equals the mar-
ginal utility of private consumption. This equation states that the optimal
labour supply is a negative function of e¤ective government consumption
(´G). The reason for this is that an increase in ´G decreases the mar-
ginal utility of private consumption, causing the household to consume more
leisure and work less. Finally, the …rst-order condition for the household’s
money demand can be written as
Mt
Pt
=
·
Â (Ct + ´Gt)
µ
1
1 ¡ ±t
¶¸ 1
"
: (9)
The preceding equation states that the optimal amount of money balances
is a function of e¤ective consumption. The reason for this is that an increase
in ´G reduces the marginal utility of money balances, thus the household
substitutes private consumption with real balances (Ganelli 2003).
A Foreign household’s optimal labour supply is analogous to that of a
Home household. In addition, a Foreign household’s optimal consumption
and money demand can be written as
±¤tP
¤
t+1
¡
C¤t+1 + ´G
¤
t+1
¢
Et+1 = ¯P
¤
t (C
¤
t + ´G
¤
t ) Et; (10)
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M¤t
P ¤t
=
"
Â (C¤t + ´G
¤
t )
Ã
1
1 ¡ ±¤Et+1Et
!#1
"
: (11)
2.3 The Government
Assume that governments in both countries balance their budgets each pe-
riod and …nance their spending by means of non-distortionary taxes and
seigniorage. The Home government budget constraint, expressed in per
capita terms, is given by
Gt = ¿ t +
Mt ¡ Mt¡1
Pt
. (12)
Government spending is assumed to follow a …rst-order autoregressive process
G^t = ½G^t¡1 + shock:
In the preceding equation, ½ governs the persistence of a …scal shock and
the hat notation is used to represent the percentage deviations from the
initial steady state. The Foreign country’s budget constraint, government
composite consumption and government spending are analogously de…ned.
2.4 Firms
2.4.1 Technology and Pro…ts
If government consumption is not a substitute for private consumption, we
consider the role of public services as an input to private production, as
in Barro (1990). In this case, we assume that public services are publicly-
provided private goods, which are rival and excludable. Thus, public services
are not subject to congestion e¤ects and the model abstracts from external-
ities associated with the use of public services. As pointed out by Barro
(1990), the general idea of including public services a separate argument of
the production function is that private inputs are not a close substitute for
public inputs. We assume that the ‡ow of public services that enter the
production function corresponds to (per capita) government spending.
Each …rm, with the total number normalized to unity, produces a di¤er-
entiated good. The production function of Home …rm z is (the situation of
Foreign …rms is completely analogous)
yt (z) = `t (z)G
®
t ;
where yt (z) is the total output of …rm z and parameter ® (> 0) captures the
degree of a positive e¤ect that government spending induces on the …rm’s
production. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale in `
but diminishing returns in G.
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Total output is divided between output sold at the Home market, de-
noted by xt (z), and output sold at the Foreign market, denoted by vt (z).
Firm z minimizes cost wt`t (z) subject to the above technology. The nominal
marginal cost is given by
MCt =
wt
G®
: (13)
The pro…ts of a Home …rm are given by
¼t (z) = pt (z)xt (z) + Etp
¤
t (z) vt (z) ¡ wt`t (z) : (14)
The …rst term on the right hand side is revenues from Home sales and the
second term is revenues from Foreign sales. The total output of a Foreign
…rm is divided between output sold at the Home market, denoted by v¤t (z¤),
and output sold at the Foreign market, denoted by x¤t (z¤). The pro…ts of a
Foreign …rm are given by
¼¤t (z
¤) = p¤t (z
¤)x¤t (z
¤) +
pt (z¤) v¤t (z¤)
Et
¡ w¤t `¤t (z¤) : (15)
Given composite consumption indexes and integrating demand for good
z across all households, we see that the demand functions for a typical Home
…rm’s output are given by
xt (z) =
µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt) ;
vt (z) =
µ
p¤t (z)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n) C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ] :
These equations represent goods market clearing conditions for a typical
Home …rm in Home and Foreign market, respectively. Analogously, the
demand functions for a typical Foreign …rm in Home and Foreign market,
respectively, are given by
v¤t (z
¤) =
µ
pt (z
¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt) ;
x¤t (z
¤) =
µ
p¤t (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n) C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ] :
Making use of goods market clearing conditions, the pro…t functions of
a typical Home and Foreign …rm can be written as
¼t (z) =
"µ
p¤t (z)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n)C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ]
#
(Etp
¤
t (z) vt (z) ¡ MCt) +"µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt)
#
(pt (z) ¡ MCt) ; (16)
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¼¤t (z
¤) =
"µ
p¤t (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n)C¤t + (1 ¡ n) G¤t ]
#
(p¤t (z
¤) ¡ MC¤t )
+
"µ
pt (z
¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt)
#µ
pt (z
¤)
Et
¡ MC¤t
¶
:
2.4.2 Staggered Price Setting
We assume that …rms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983).
But before turning to staggered adjustment, we …rst examine the optimal
price setting under complete price ‡exibility. Since monopoly …rms can
price-discriminate across countries, that are free to set di¤erent prices across
countries to maximize pro…ts. However, given the pro…t function [equation
(16)], a pro…t maximizing Home …rm ends up choosing prices that are a
constant markup over marginal costs
pt (z) = Etp
¤
t (z) =
µ
µ ¡ 1MCt
such that the law of one price holds. The price setting problem facing a
typical Foreign …rm is also identical to that of a Home …rm, and it chooses
prices that are a constraint markup over Foreign marginal costs.
In the short run, prices are sticky. Following Calvo (1983) we assume
that each …rm resets its price in any given period with probability 1 ¡ °,
independently of time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Each …rm has
to take this into account when setting its pro…t-maximizing price that there
is a probability 0 < ° < 1 that it cannot revise its price setting decision
made in period s (s < t) in period t. When setting a new price in period t,
…rm z seeks to maximize the present value of pro…ts weighting future pro…ts
by the probability that the price will still be e¤ective in period s. Thus a
typical Home …rm seeks to maximize
max
pt(z);p¤t (z)
Vt (z) =
1X
s=t
°s¡t³ t;s¼t (z) ;
where ³s;t = ¦
t
j=s (1 + Rj)
¡1 is the Home nominal discount factor. The
optimal price setting strategy for a Home …rm is to set the following prices
pt (z) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
MCsP1
s=t °
s¡t³ t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ ; (17)
p¤t (z) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P ¤s
´¡µ
MCsP1
s=t °
s¡t³t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ
Et
: (18)
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Equation (17) is the pro…t maximizing Home currency price of a good sold in
the Home country and equation (18) governs the pro…t maximizing Foreign
currency price of a good sold in the Foreign country. The price setting
problem facing Foreign …rms is again identical to that of a Home …rm. The
optimal Home currency price of a Foreign good sold in the Home country and
Foreign currency price of a good sold in the Foreign country are, respectively
pt (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
w¤sP1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
=Et
; (19)
p¤t (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P ¤s
´¡µ
w¤sP1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ : (20)
We can use equation (17) -(20) to obtain di¤erence equations describing
the evolution of the optimal prices. After some algebra, one can get
p^t (z) = ¯°p^t+1 (z) + (1 ¡ ¯°) M^Ct; (21)
p^¤t (z) = ¯°p^
¤
t+1 (z) + (1 ¡ ¯°)
³
M^Ct ¡ E^t
´
; (22)
p^t (z
¤) = ¯°p^t+1 (z¤) + (1 ¡ ¯°)
³
M^C¤t + E^t
´
; (23)
p^¤t (z
¤) = ¯°p^¤t+1 (z) + (1 ¡ ¯°) M^C¤t : (24)
We denote percentage changes from the initial steady state by hats, thus, for
any variable X^t ´ dXt= ¹X0, where ¹X0 is the initial steady-state value. For
example, equation (22) governs the optimal price adjustment rule for a Home
good sold at the Foreign market, in terms of Foreign currency. Equations
(21)-(24) emphasize the forward looking nature of in‡ation. Firms that are
re-setting their prices recognize that the prices that they set will remain
e¤ective for more than one period. As a result, …rms …nd it optimal to
take into account their expectations regarding the future exchange rate (if
goods are sold abroad) and marginal costs, instead of looking at the current
exchange rate and marginal costs only.
2.5 A Symmetric Steady State
All …rms in the country are symmetric, which implies that they set the same
output and when resetting prices in any given period they choose the same
price. Each period a measure of 1 ¡ ° of the …rms reset their prices while a
fraction ° keep their prices unchanged. Thus we can rewrite the Home and
Foreign country CPIs, equations (2) and (3), as
Pt =
"
n (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=t
°s¡tpt¡s (z)1¡µ + (1 ¡ n) (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=t
°s¡tpt¡s (z¤)1¡µ
# 1
1¡µ
;
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P ¤t =
"
n (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=t
°s¡tp¤t¡s (z)
1¡µ + (1 ¡ n) (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=t
°s¡tp¤t¡s (z
¤)1¡µ
# 1
1¡µ
:
Following previous work we consider the special case of zero net Foreign
assets and equal government spending levels. In addition, in this steady
state all exogenous variables are constant. Constant consumption implies
that the steady-state world interest rate is tied down by consumption Euler
equations (7) and (10): ¯ = ¹± =
¡
1 + ¹R
¢¡1, where steady-state values are
marked by overbars.
The consolidated budget constraint of the Home economy is derived by
using equation (5), the government budget constraint (12) and the pro…ts
of a Home …rm (14). It can be written as
±tDt = Dt¡1 + pt (z)xt (z) + Etp¤t (z) v (z) ¡ PtCt ¡ PtGt:
Analogously, the consolidated budget constraint of the Foreign economy is
derived by using corresponding Foreign equations together with the asset-
market-clearing condition
¡ n
1 ¡ n±
¤
t
Dt
Et
= ¡ n
1 ¡ n
Dt¡1
Et
+p¤t (z
¤)x¤t (z
¤)+
pt (z
¤) v¤t (z¤)
Et
¡P ¤t C¤t ¡P ¤t G¤t :
2.6 A Log-Linearized Model
The model is log-linearized around the initial symmetric steady state with
¹D0 = ¹D
¤
0 = 0 and ¹G0 = ¹G
¤
0 = 0. The linearization is implemented by ex-
pressing the model in terms of percentage deviations from the initial steady
state. Those variables whose initial steady-state value is zero are normalized
by consumption. Equilibrium of the log-linear version of the model can be
described by the following equations
±^t + P^t+1 + C^t+1 + ´G^t+1 = P^t + C^t + ´G^t (25)
±^
¤
t + P^
¤
t+1 + C^
¤
t+1 + ´G^
¤
t+1 + E^t+1 = P^
¤
t + C^
¤
t + ´G^
¤
t + E^t (26)
^`
t = w^t ¡ C^t ¡ ´G^t ¡ P^t (27)
^`¤
t = w^
¤
t ¡ C^¤t ¡ ´G^¤t ¡ P^ ¤t (28)
M^t ¡ P^t = 1
²
C^t +
´
"
G^t +
¯±^t
² (1 ¡ ¯) (29)
M^¤t ¡ P^ ¤t =
1
²
C^¤t +
´
"
G^¤t +
³
±^
¤
t + E^t+1 ¡ E^t
´
¯
² (1 ¡ ¯) (30)
¯D^t = n
³
x^t (z) + b^t (z)
´
+(1 ¡ n)
³
E^t + v^t (z) + b^
¤
t (z)
´
¡D^t+1¡P^t¡C^t¡G^t
(31)
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y^t = ^`t + ®G^t (32)
y^¤t = ^`
¤
t + ®G^
¤
t (33)
x^t (z) = ¡µ
³
b^t (z) ¡ P^t
´
+ C^t + G^t (34)
v^t (z) = ¡µ
³
b^¤t (z) ¡ P^ ¤t
´
+ C^¤t + G^
¤
t (35)
v^¤t (z
¤) = ¡µ
³
b^t (z
¤) ¡ P^t
´
+ C^t + G^t (36)
x^¤t (z
¤) = ¡µ
³
b^¤t (z
¤) ¡ P^ ¤t
´
+ C^¤t + G^
¤
t (37)
y^t = nx^t + (1 ¡ n) v^t (38)
y^¤t = nx^
¤
t + (1 ¡ n) v^¤t (39)
G^t = ½G^t¡1 + shock (40)
G^¤t = ½G^
¤
t¡1 + shock
¤ (41)
P^t = nb^t (z) + (1 ¡ n) b^t (z¤) (42)
P^ ¤t = nb^
¤
t (z) + (1 ¡ n) b^¤t (z¤) (43)
where
b^t (z) = (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=t
°s¡tp^s (z) ) b^t (z) = °b^t¡1 (z) + (1 ¡ °) p^t (z) (44)
b^¤t (z) = °b^
¤
t¡1 (z) + (1 ¡ °) p^¤t (z) (45)
b^t (z) = °b^t¡1 (z¤) + (1 ¡ °) p^t (z¤) (46)
b^¤t (z
¤) = °b^¤t¡1 (z
¤) + (1 ¡ °) p^¤t (z¤) (47)
Equations (25) -(30) represent the log-linearized versions of the …rst-order
conditions for the typical households‘problem. Equation (31) is the log-
linearized version of the consolidated budget constraint, equations (32) and
(33) are the production functions and equations (34)-(37) are the demand
curves. Equations (38) and (39) are log-linear versions of the (population-
weighted) composition of Home and Foreign aggregate output, respectively.
Equations (40) and (41) govern government spending. Equations (42) and
(43) govern the evolution of Home and Foreign CPIs, respectively.
28 variables remain to be determined C;C¤; P ¤; ±; ±¤; `; `¤; w;w¤;D; x (z) ;
v (x) ; x¤ (z¤) ; v¤ (x¤) ; y; y¤; p (z) ; p¤ (x) ; p¤ (z¤) ; p (x¤) ; b (z) ;b¤ (z) ; b¤ (z¤) ; b (x¤) ;
E;G and G¤. The 28 equations that jointly determine them are (21) -(47)
and the log-linear version of the asset-market-clearing condition. Note that
the Foreign consolidated budget constraint is left out because one equation
is redundant by Walras’law.
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3 The International Transmission of Fiscal Shocks
3.1 Calibration
Much of the quantitative analysis that follows relies on a baseline calibration
of the model. In order to numerically solve the model, we use the method
developed by Klein (2000) and software written by McCallum (2001).5 The
calibration of the model is fairly standard and follows Sutherland (1996).
The main assumptions underlying the calibration are as follows. The elas-
ticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods µ is set to 6, a value
consistent with a 20 percent mark-up in the steady state. The subjective
discount factor ¯ is set to 1/1.05. Parameter °, the probability of not ad-
justing prices in any given period, is set equal to 0.5. This implies an average
delay between price adjustments of two periods. In the baseline calibration,
we set " = 9 which implies a rather low consumption elasticity of money
demand (1/"). The two counties are of equal size, and thus n is set to
0.5. Parameter ½ is set to one (zero) if government spending shocks are
permanent (temporary).
In addition, to highlight the consequences of useful government spending,
we need parameter values for ´ and ®. Aschauer’s (1989) estimates of the
degree of substitutability between private and government consumption are
in the range of 0.23 to 0.42. Our choice of the marginal rate of substitution
between private and government consumption is 0.3. We use the estimate
of the output elasticity of public capital as a proxy for the positive e¤ect
that government spending exerts on the …rms’production. Ai and Cassou’s
(1995) estimates of the output elasticity of public capital are in the range
of 0.15 to 0.26. We set ® = 0:2.
3.2 Permanent Government Spending Shocks
3.2.1 Productive Government Spending
We begin by discussing the dynamic e¤ects of an unanticipated permanent
increase in Home government spending on a number of economic variables.
We consider two alternative cases, in one case government spending a¤ects
productivity but not utility and in the other case government spending is
pure waste (government spending does not a¤ect productivity or utility).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the impulse responses to a 1 percent unilateral
increase in Home government spending. In Figures, the horizontal axes show
time and the vertical axes show the variables‘percentage deviations from
the initial steady state.6 In addition, the CPI-based real exchange rate is
5 I am grateful to Christian Pierdzioch for providing some Matlab code.
6Since those variables, whose initial steady-state value is zero are normalized by con-
sumption, home bond holdings show deviation as a percentage of initial consumption
level.
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de…ned as
Real exchange rate =
EtP ¤t
Pt
.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the rise in Home government spending
causes Home and Foreign output and consumption to move in the same di-
rection immediately after the shock. In the long run, Home consumption
falls and Foreign consumption rises, so that the cross country comovement
of consumption levels is negative. The rise in Home government spend-
ing increases the demand for both Home and Foreign goods, but domestic
households are forced to foot the taxes that …nance it. Higher taxes lead to
an immediate fall in Home consumption, but because households respond
by substituting into work out of leisure at the same time, the net e¤ect on
world aggregate demand is positive.
As expected, the introduction of productive government spending has a
positive e¤ect on Home output. When public services enter into the pro-
duction function, government spending has a direct positive e¤ect on Home
output. At the same time, productive government spending decreases the
marginal costs of Home …rms allowing the …rms to sell their products at
lower prices.
The nominal exchange rate depreciates because the relative consumption
change lowers the relative demand for Home money. If government spending
is productive, the relative consumption change is smaller and consequently
the nominal exchange rate depreciates by less. As shown by Betts and Dev-
ereux (2000), under LCP, exchange rate overshooting can occur in response
to economic shocks.7 Panel (e) in Figure 1 highlights that the nominal ex-
change rate overshoots its long-run level. As in Betts and Devereux (2000),
exchange rate overshooting (undershooting) occurs in response to a …scal
shock if the consumption elasticity of money demand is smaller (greater)
than one. The interest rate must fall to clear the Home money market and
a fall in the Home interest rate is possible if the exchange rate is expected
to appreciate. The exchange rate, therefore, has to overshoot its long-run
equilibrium inducing an interest-rate di¤erential that equals the expected
rate of appreciation.
When prices are sticky and denominated in the currency of the buyer, the
movement in the nominal exchange rate translates into a real depreciation.
If government spending is productive, due to a smaller nominal exchange
rate depreciation the real exchange rate depreciates by less. As prices can
be adjusted, the real exchange moves back towards its original level. The
assumption of identical consumption baskets together with the law of one
price (under ‡exible prices) implies a constant real exchange in the long run.
7 In the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, the nominal exchange rate jumps immediately to its
long-run level. Also in Sutherland’s (1996) calibrated model, which intoduces staggered
price setting into the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, the nominal exchange rate makes a once-
and-for-all step change in response to monetary and …scal shocks.
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To the extent that some …rms cannot adjust their prices, there is no
exchange-rate pass-through to import prices and thus the depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate does not a¤ect the relative price of Home and
Foreign goods in either country. Consequently, the assumption about full
LCP diminishes the expenditure switching e¤ect associated with unexpected
changes in the nominal exchange rate. In the case of LCP, exchange rate
movements, instead of altering relative prices, have important implications
for the revenues of …rms [recall equations (14) and (15)]. When …rms price
their goods in terms of local currency, the depreciation raises the revenues of
Home …rms measured in Home currency terms, and reduces the revenues of
Foreign …rms measured in Foreign currency terms, at given production levels.
Therefore, the depreciation causes a redistribution of income towards the
Home economy and this e¤ect raises Home consumption relative to Foreign
consumption. However, this e¤ect is more than o¤set by higher taxes and
thus this e¤ect only diminishes the fall in Home consumption.
Although the exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is zero among
the …rms that cannot adjust their prices immediately after the shock, there
is still a small expenditure-switching impact of the exchange rate depreci-
ation. This is due to the fact that optimal prices for goods that are sold
abroad change when the exchange rate ‡uctuates. To the extent that …rms
can reset their prices, the exchange rate deprecation changes optimal prices
immediately after the shock [recall equations (22) and (23)].8 As panels
(c) in Figures 2 and 3 displays, although Home …rms will experience an
increase in their marginal costs it is optimal to lower the Foreign currency
price of goods sold at the Foreign market. The change in the relative price
of imported to Foreign goods leads to the reallocation of consumption.
Panel (g) in Figure 1 shows some wealth accumulation by Foreign house-
holds immediately after the shock and that productive government spending
reinforces the impact of a …scal shock on the bond holdings of Foreign house-
holds. Foreign output increases in the short run. Therefore, to smooth con-
sumption, Foreign households save and lower current consumption. Panel
(d) displays that if government spending is productive a …scal shock induces
a greater tilt in the path of output. Thus, Foreign households accumulate
more wealth. A permanent improvement in the bond holdings of Foreign
households implies allows for a permanent trade balance de…cit which is
…nanced by a services balance surplus. This trade balance de…cit make
possible higher Foreign consumption.
As can be seen from panel (h), the Home terms of trade deteriorates. The
reason for the deterioration is the increase in relative Home output. Lower
wealth via the current account leads to some increase in work e¤ort, but
the main reason for the increase in Home output is the higher tax burden.
8Panels (c) and (d) in Figures 2 and 3 show how optimal prices are a¤ected by the
changes in the nominal exchange rate and nominal wages.
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The negative wealth e¤ects increase relative Home output thus causing a
permanent deterioration in its terms of trade. If government spending is
productive, the Home terms of trade deteriorates by more because Home
…rms sell their extra production at lower prices.
Panel (c) in Figure 1 shows that the in‡uence of productive Home gov-
ernment spending on Foreign consumption is positive. The reason behind
this is that when government spending is productive both higher Foreign
wealth and the improvement in the Foreign terms of trade allow Foreign
households to increase their consumption. A closer look at Panel (d) reveals
that a …scal shock is predicted to slightly decrease Foreign output in the new
steady state. The reason is that with higher wealth (consumption), Foreign
households shift out of work into leisure. Panel (d) also reveals that the in-
troduction of productive government spending has a negative spillover e¤ect
on Foreign output in the long run. Higher consumption, which pushes For-
eign households to consume more leisure, explains why the consequence of
productive Home government spending on Foreign consumption is negative
in the long run. However, this impact is certainly very small.
We would like to highlight two features of the responses shown in Figure
1. First, the spillover e¤ects of Home …scal policy on the Foreign economy
seem to be fairly small in the long run, with the exception that the compo-
sition of production changes as the country’s export sector expands.9 The
e¤ects of Home …scal policy on the Foreign country are substantially smaller
than those reported by Betts and Devereux (2001). As mentioned, a …scal
shock slightly decreases Foreign output in the long run. Hence, the model
predicts a negative cross country comovement of output levels in the long
run, as in Betts and Devereux (2001). Second, it is worth observing that
a rise in government spending induces a substantially smaller increase in
Home output than in the model of Betts and Devereux (2001), even though
we allow for productive government spending. The main reason for the dif-
ference is that, in their model, a …scal policy shock leads to a large increase
in investment.
The analysis of this section demonstrates that the qualitative e¤ects of
…scal policy are not sensitive to the introduction of productive government
spending. All macroeconomic variables move qualitative in the same way, in
response to a permanent …scal shock. The consequences of productive gov-
ernment spending on the macroeconomic variables are purely quantitative.
The cynical reader might conclude from this that the introduction of useful
government spending is not necessary. A more appropriate conclusion would
be that in analyzing the international e¤ects of …scal policy it is important to
take into account the composition of government expenditures. Moreover, if
9The result, that a Home …scal shock greatly changes the composition of Foreign out-
put although the impact on aggregate output is next to nothing, suggests that a lot of
information is lost, if we concentrate the analysis only on the macroeconomic e¤ects of
…scal policy.
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public services are productive inputs for private …rms, then the assumption
of non-productive government spending leads to an underestimation of the
e¤ectiveness of …scal policy.
3.2.2 Utility-Enhancing Government Spending
We now turn to the consequences of utility-enhancing government spending
and consider the same unanticipated permanent rise in Home government
spending equal to 1 percent (of initial consumption). Figure 4 shows the
dynamic e¤ects of a Home …scal shock on macroeconomic variables. As
before, we consider the case in which government spending is pure waste as
a benchmark to illustrate the consequences of the assumption ´ > 0.
Figure 4 displays that the introduction of utility-enhancing government
spending tends to have negative e¤ects on Home consumption and output.
These e¤ects are the same as in Ganelli (2003) and for the same reason.
The reason is direct crowding-out: the fact that private and government
consumption are substitutes has a direct crowding-out e¤ect on private con-
sumption (Ganelli 2003, 99). When private and government consumption
are substitutes the fall in private consumption is bigger than in the pure
waste case and the positive e¤ect of a …scal shock on output is decreasing in
´. An increase in ´G raises Home leisure in every period because it reduces
the marginal utility of private consumption and consequently households are
less willing to supply labour [recall equation (8)]. This also explains why
the Home terms of trade deteriorates by less than in the case of pure waste.
A fall in the supply of Home goods raises their relative price.
Figure 4 shows that the introduction of utility-enhancing government
spending has a negative e¤ect on Foreign consumption and output in the
short-run. In the short-run, as in Ganelli (2003), the reduction in Home
consumption due to direct crowding-out decreases the demand for Foreign
goods, reducing Foreign output and consumption relative to the pure waste
case. In the long-run, the output spillover becomes positive, if only the
magnitude of the change in Foreign output is next to nothing. As Panel (e)
shows the introduction of utility-enhancing government spending mitigates
the response of bond holdings of Home households which implies that the
net wealth of Foreign households increases by less than in the pure waste
case. This pushes Foreign households to consume less leisure and work more.
The main di¤erences between the results of this model and those of
Ganelli (2003) can be found from the long-run spillover e¤ects. In Ganelli
(2003), the introduction of utility-enhancing government spending has an
ambiguous e¤ect on Foreign long-run consumption and a negative e¤ect on
Foreign output. In this model, for the reason discussed above, the intro-
duction of utility-enhancing government spending increases Foreign output,
relative to the pure waste case. In addition, utility-enhancing government
spending has a negative e¤ect on Foreign consumption. The reason is that,
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unlike in Ganelli (2003), the international distribution of wealth increases
Foreign consumption and lower its output. If government spending yields
utility, the increase in Foreign wealth is smaller. Consequently Foreign
households have less money for consumption and they also increase their
labour supply.
As Panel (d) in Figure 4 points out the introduction of utility-enhancing
government spending mitigates the real exchange rate depreciation due to
a smaller nominal exchange rate depreciation. As emphasized by Ganelli
(2003), the direct and indirect e¤ects on money demand pull in opposite
directions. The direct e¤ect is caused by the relative consumption change
which tends to lower the relative demand for Home money. The indirect
e¤ect is caused by the fact that money demand is now also a positive function
of e¤ective government consumption [recall equation (9)], which tends to
raise Home money demand. The indirect e¤ect dominates insomuch that the
nominal exchange rate depreciates by less than in the pure waste benchmark.
The analysis of this section demonstrates that the consequences of utility-
enhancing government spending in this model are very identical to the
…ndings of Ganelli (2003). As mentioned, however, this is model utility-
enhancing government spending has a positive e¤ect on Foreign consump-
tion, for the reason discussed above. New …ndings are, …rst, that utility-
enhancing government spending mitigates the impact of a …scal shock on the
real exchange rate, issue that did not arise in the PCP framework. Second,
as mentioned earlier, utility-enhancing government spending also mitigates
the e¤ect of a …scal shock on the international distribution wealth.
3.3 Temporary Government Spending Shocks
Figures 5 and 6 display the e¤ects of a temporary Home government spend-
ing shock, in the case where government spending does not a¤ect produc-
tivity or private utility. One striking feature of the responses is that a tem-
porary …scal shock causes remarkably identical e¤ects on both countries.
A visual inspection of Figure 5 suggests that the correlation of Home and
Foreign output is much higher than in the case of a permanent …scal shock.
The correlation of Home and Foreign output rises since a …scal shock now
increases demand for imports at almost …xed relative price of imports in
terms of Home currency.10 And because the e¤ect of the higher tax burden
on labour supply is fairly small.
Several other observations are in order. First, the e¤ect of a temporary
…scal shock on the bond holdings of Home households is relatively high. The
10This …nding is slightly di¤erent from Betts and Devereux (2000). If all prices are sticky
and output is demand-detemined in the short run, then a …scal shock raises demand for
imports at the …xed relative price of imports in terms of Home currency. In this case,
"both home and foreign output must rise by equal amounts" (Betts – Devereux 2000,
235).
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induced wealth changes via current account imbalances have real e¤ects that
last for all time, albeit the magnitudes are small. Second, the impact of a
temporary …scal shock on the nominal and real exchange rate and the terms
of trade is very small. Third, the time paths of the real exchange and the
terms of traded are identical to ones found in the case of a permanent …scal
shock. Four, Panels (b) in Figures 2 and 6 highlight that the qualitative
response of the Home nominal wage to a …scal shock immediately after the
shock is dependent on whether the shock is permanent or temporary.
3.4 Exchange Rate Fluctuations: A Sensitivity Analysis
As noted by Lane (2001, 261), many predictions of the theoretical NOEM
models are sensitive to the choice of parameter values. To complement the
quantitative analysis we conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate to what
extent the e¤ects of …scal permanent shocks are sensitive to the calibration
of two key parameters: the consumption elasticity of money demand and a
measure of …rms that sets new prices each period. In the sensitivity analysis,
we consider the case in which government spending is pure waste.
3.4.1 The Consumption Elasticity of Money Demand
As illustrated by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) and Betts and Devereux (2000),
the consumption elasticity of money demand is a key variable in determining
the nominal exchange rate response to economic shocks. Therefore, we now
analyze how changing this elasticity a¤ects exchange rate dynamics and the
transmission of …scal policy. Since Mankiw and Summer’s (1986) estimates
of the consumption elasticity of money demand are very close to unity, we
now set " = 1. Figures 7 and 8 display the dynamic e¤ects of a …scal shock
under the two cases considered.
As above, the nominal exchange rate depreciates because the relative
consumption change lowers the relative demand for Home money. Panel
(c) in Figure 7 shows a once-and-for-all depreciation of the nominal ex-
change rate of just less than 0.6 percent. As shown by Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995), the lower the consumption elasticity of money demand is the less
the nominal exchange rate depreciates. The panel highlights that the e¤ect
of a …scal shock on the nominal exchange rate is now drastically greater
than in the baseline case. If exchange rate ‡uctuations are measured by the
impact of the shock, then a low consumption elasticity of money demand
reduces nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations, notwithstanding exchange rate
overshooting. In addition, Panel (d) demonstrates that a higher deprecation
of the nominal exchange rate translates into a higher real depreciation.
The higher nominal exchange rate depreciation has several implications
for the transmission of …scal policy. As above, the main economic e¤ects of
the exchange rate depreciation are on the revenues of …rms. In this case,
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the depreciation redistributes incomes by much more than in the benchmark
case. The reduction in the revenues of Foreign …rms lowers Foreign consump-
tion, even though Foreign output increases. A rise in Home government
spending, therefore, tends to produce a positive cross country comovement
of consumption immediately after the shock.
As noted by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), if prices are temporarily sticky
in the importing country’s currency, then unexpected currency depreciations
can be associated with improvements of the terms of trade, contrary to the
customary presumption. Panel (f) in Figure 7 displays that the nominal de-
preciation induces an improvement in the Home terms of trade immediately
after the shock. The Home currency price of paid for goods imported from
abroad and the Foreign currency price of goods exported abroad are almost
…xed, however, an exchange rate depreciation raises export prices measured
in Home currency [recall equation (4)]. A …scal shock, therefore, causes an
improvement in the Home country’s terms of trade. As prices are adjusted,
the in‡uence of a …scal shock on the terms of trade is reversed.
3.4.2 Varying the Degree of Price Stickiness
In this section, we examine to what extent sluggish price adjustment a¤ects
exchange rate dynamics. A reason to do this is that in this model, as in
Dornbusch (1976), the overshooting of the nominal exchange rate derives
from di¤erential adjustment speeds in goods and asset markets. Therefore,
the speed of price adjustment has important implications for exchange rate
dynamics.
To show how the degree of price stickiness a¤ects exchange rate dynamics
and consequently …scal policy transmission, we set the fraction of …rms that
change their price each period to 0.2. This implies that the average interval
between price changes for a given …rm is 5 periods and hence prices become
more sticky. Figure 9 displays the macroeconomic e¤ects of a …scal shock,
maintaining the assumption " = 9. Note that the number of periods shown
is increased to 15.
Figure 9 shows that decreasing the degree of price ‡exibility increases
exchange rate ‡uctuations in two respect –exactly as should be expected.
First, the higher the degree of price stickiness is the more the nominal and
real exchange rate depreciate. Second, the higher the degree of price sticki-
ness is the larger and more persistent the overshooting of the nominal and
real exchange rate is. This is consistent with Dornbusch (1976) who show
that the magnitude and persistence of exchange rate overshooting is inversely
related to the speed of adjustment of prices.
One common result of the sensitivity analysis is that the qualitative
responses of the variables are robust to changes in parameter values. Ex-
ceptions are the responses of the terms of trade and Foreign consumption in
the short run. The sensitivity analysis also illustrates that the quantitative
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e¤ects of …scal policy on the international distribution of wealth and the
nominal and real exchange rate are sensitive to parameter values.
4 Conclusions
Virtually all NOEM models, that address …scal policy issues, can be crit-
icized for the assumption that government spending is pure waste. The
present paper develops a model in which government spending can a¤ect
productivity and utility. Then we use the model to analyze the interna-
tional transmission of …scal policy. The main point of this paper is that
of studying the consequences of productive government spending on the in-
ternational transmission of …scal policy. We show that the introduction of
productive government spending tends to have positive e¤ects on domestic
consumption and output, but it also has a positive e¤ect on foreign consump-
tion. We demonstrate that productive government spending mitigates the
impact of …scal policy on the nominal and real exchange rate. In addition,
productive government spending reinforces the international distribution of
wealth and the deterioration in the terms of trade.
The assumption of non-productive government spending, a standard as-
sumption in the NOEM literature, leads to an underestimation of the e¤ec-
tiveness of …scal policy. On the other hand, if government consumption is a
substitute for private consumption, the assumption of pure waste leads to an
overestimation of the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. The main conclusion of
this paper could be that in assessing the international e¤ects of …scal policy
it is important to take into account the composition of public expenditures.
The identical point is made by Ganelli (2005) who show that the interna-
tional e¤ects of …scal policy in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model are quite di¤erent
if one assumes complete home bias in government spending.
This model assumes that all …rms set prices in the local currency of the
buyer and thus the degree of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices
is zero. This assumption, of course, does not match reality exactly. On
the other hand, the …ndings of Betts and Devereux (2001) suggests that
the international e¤ects of …scal policy are not especially sensitive to the
currency of export invoicing. This suggests that the main results of this
paper would not change much if we assumed prices to be sticky in produc-
ers’currencies. Anyway, an interesting extension would involve the optimal
invoicing choice along the lines of Devereux et al. (2004) and Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2005). Then the model would feature endogenous exchange-
rate pass-through as …rms could choose the currency in which they set their
export prices.
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Figure 1: Productive government spending – the impulse responses to an
unexpected permanent rise in Home government spending
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Figure 2: The impulse responses to an unexpected permanent rise in Home
government spending, ® = 0
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
(a) Consumer price indexes
Home
Foreign
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
(c) Prices of Home goods
p(z)
p*(z)
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(d) Prices of Foreign Goods
p(z*)
p*(z*)
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(e) Home output
x(z)
v(z)
y(z)
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
(f) Foreign output
x*(z*)
v*(z*)
y*(z*)
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
(b) Nominal wage rates
Home
Foreign
27
Figure 3: The impulse responses to an unexpected permanent rise in Home
government spending, ® = 0:2
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Figure 4: Utility-enhancing government consumption – the impulse re-
sponses to an unexpected permanant rise in Home government spending
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Figure 5: The impulse responses to an unexpected temporary rise in Home
government spending (® = ´ = 0)
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Figure 6: The impulse responses to an unexpected temporary rise in Home
government spending (® = ´ = 0)
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Figure 7: A sensitivity analysis –the role of the consumption elasticity of
money demand. The impulse responses to an unexpected permanent rise in
Home government spending (® = ´ = 0)
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Figure 8: A sensitivity analysis –the role of the consumption elasticity of
money demand. The impulse responses to an unexpected permanent rise in
Home government spending (" = 1 and ® = ´ = 0)
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Figure 9: A sensitivity analysis –varying the degree of price stickiness. The
impulse responses to an unexpected permanent rise in Home government
spending (" = 9 and ® = ´ = 0 )
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